Trust and Corruption*
    
    Eric M. Uslaner Department of Government and Politics University of Maryland–College Park College Park, MD 20742 euslaner@gvpt.umd.edu
    
    For Johann Graf Lambsdorf, Markus Taube, and Matthias Schramm, eds., Corruption and the New Institutional Economics (London: Routledge, 2004)
    
    Uslaner, “Trust and Corruption” (1)
    
    Willie Sutton, one of America’s most famous criminals, was asked by a judge at one of his trials why he robbed banks. “That’s where they keep the money,” he replied. That’s one man’s story, based firmly in rational choice theory. Why do others rob banks, refuse to pay their taxes, or flout the law more generally? My concern here is not about why individuals pay little heed to the law, but rather why respect for the law is greater in some countries compared to others–and why this matters. I shall investigate the relationship between corruption and trust. Corruption is illegal (or barely legal) behavior by political elites, to manipulate the affairs of state for private gain. Trust is a value expressing the belief that others are part of your moral community. It lays the basis for cooperation with people who are different from yourself (Fukayama, 1995, 153; Uslaner, 2002, ch. 2). Trusting societies have less corruption. 1 People who have faith in others are more likely to endorse strong standards of moral and legal behavior (Uslaner, 1999a, 1999b). Alternatively, people who believe that the legal system is fair and impartial are more likely to trust their fellow citizens (Rothstein, 2000). Societies with more generalized trust and less corruption have better governance, stronger economic growth, spend more on redistribution, and have greater respect for the law among the citizenry. If we want to achieve any or all of these goals (or policies), where do we begin? Do we start with trust or with corruption? Can we simply put the rascals who loot the public purse in jail or must we work to increase trust in society, an arguably much tougher task? How might we reduce corruption or increase trust? My message is not one of optimism. My initial cross-section results suggests that the
    
    Uslaner, “Trust and Corruption” (2) connection between trust and corruption is indeed reciprocal–and that the effect of corruption on trust is greater than the opposite causal claim (trust begets an honest political system). It seems that there is considerable support for the old Chinese maxim, “The fish rots from the head down.” Corrupt leaders breed distrust throughout society. However, an analysis of changes in trust and corruption leads to a different and more pessimistic conclusion: As societies become less corrupt, they do not become more trusting. Yet, as countries become more trusting, they become less corrupt. When I turn to the consequences of trust and corruption, I shall show that the causal connection is from trust to corruption, not the other way around. So simply rounding up the usual suspects among the elite and tossing them in the clink will not produce better economic performance or lead to better governance. The Scourge of Corruption Trust leads us to give of ourselves, in both time (volunteering) and money (giving to charity, see Uslaner, 2002, ch. 7). Trust is based upon an optimistic view of the world. Trusters believe that the world is a good place, will continue to get better, and that they can make it better (Seligman, 1991; Uslaner, 2002, ch. 4). Corruption involves expropriating what rightfully belongs to others. Trust rests on a foundation of openness–accepting others for what they are, rather than for what you would like them to be. Transparency is the enemy of corruption. Corruption is systematic and involves trust among the conspirators. But this is a very different type of trust from the faith in others I have been describing. There are two dimensions of trust.. First is the distinction between moralistic and strategic trust and the second is between generalized and particularized trust. Trust as an alternative to corruption reflects moralistic trust (the belief that people of different backgrounds may still constitute a “moral community”) and
    
    Uslaner, “Trust and Corruption” (3) generalized trust (the belief that most people can be trusted). Corruption rests on strategic trust (trust based upon experience rather than values) and particularized trust (trust only in people like yourself). Strategic trust is based upon our day to day experience with specific people: We trust someone to repay a loan or to live up to their end of a bargain based upon our experience or information we receive from other people we know. Particularized trust is faith only in people like ourselves (as opposed to people in general). Entrance into a corruption network is not easy. Members of a conspiracy of graft cannot simply assume that others are trustworthy (as moralistic trusters do). Treating strangers as if they were trustworthy (also as moralistic trusters do) can be hazardous at best. And believing that people without any ties to the conspiracy are trustworthy (as generalized trusters do) threatens the integrity of the cabal. The difference between generalized and particularized trust is similar to the distinction Putnam (2000, 22) draws between “bonding” and “bridging” social capital. The central idea distinguishing generalized from particularized trust is how inclusive your moral community is. The Roots of Graft The boss of New York City’s Tammany Hall Democratic party machine in the 19th century, George Washington Plunkitt, explained his ill-gotten wealth: “I seen my opportunities and I took ‘em” (Riordan, 1948, 4). Corruption transfers resources from the mass public to the elites–and generally from the poor to the rich (see esp. Onishi and Banerjee, 2001). It acts as an extra tax on citizens, leaving less money for public expenditures (Mauro, 1997, 7; Tanzi, 1998, 582-583). Corrupt governments have less money to spend on their own governments, pushing down the salaries of public employees. In turn, these lower-level staffers will be more likely to
    
    Uslaner, “Trust and Corruption” (4) extort funds from the public purse. Government employees in corrupt societies will thus spend more time lining their own pockets than serving the public. Corruption thus leads to ineffective government (Mauro, 1997, 5; LaPorta et al., 1998, 32). Businesses may also bribe politicians to gain restrictions on trade and to make it more difficult and expensive for foreign companies to enter domestic markets. Corruption thus closes markets (Leite and Weidmann, 1999, 20, 23; Mauro, 1997, 4). In each instance, corruption harms the economy, by transferring funds from public purposes to private gain, and slows economic growth. Generalized trust is predicated on the notion of a common bond between classes and races and on egalitarian values (Putnam, 1993, 88, 174; Seligman, 1997, 36-37, 41). Faith in others leads to empathy for those who do not fare well, and ultimately to a redistribution of resources from the well-off the poor. If we believe that we have a shared fate with others, and especially people who are different from ourselves, then gross inequalities in wealth and status will seem to violate norms of fairness. Trusting people will thus feel an obligation to support programs that will benefit the disadvantaged. And trusting societies are more likely to spend more on social programs, to have more effective governments, to more open economies, lower crime rates, and higher economic growth (LaPorta et al., 1997, 335; Uslaner, 2002, ch. 8). Trickle Down or Bubble Up? Does corruption simply reflect venal leaders or does it have a cultural foundation? If we can control corruption by strengthening legal institutions from above, we might be able to increase the stock of trust in society. If corruption rests upon the level of trust in a society (or other cutural values; cf. Husted, 1999), it will not be so easy to control graft. Mauro (1998a, 12) offers a top-down view of corruption (in what I shall call the “rotting
    
    Uslaner, “Trust and Corruption” (5) fish” account): You live in a society where everybody steals. Do you choose to steal? The probability that you will be caught is low, because the police are very busy chasing other thieves, and, even if you do get caught, the chances of your being punished severely for a crime that is so common are low. Therefore, you too steal. By contrast, if you live in a society where theft is rare, the chances of your being caught and punished are high, so you choose not to steal. An honest government, one that enforces the law fairly and provides little opportunity for private gain, can lead people to have greater faith in each other (Levi, 1998; Misztal, 1996, 251; Offe, 1996, 27; Seligman, 1997, 37). Rothstein (2000, 19-21) finds a stronger correlation between trust in people and confidence in the legal system in Sweden than for any other political institution. He argues that we can create trust from above: Political and legal institutions that are perceived as fair, just and (reasonably) efficient, increase the likelihood that citizens will overcome social dilemmas.... In a civilized society, institutions of law and order have one particularly important task: to detect and punish people who are “traitors,” that is, those who break contracts, steal, murder, and do other such non-cooperative things and therefore should not be trusted. Thus, if you think that particular institutions do what they are supposed to do in a fair and efficient manner, then you also have reason to believe...that people will refrain from acting in a treacherous manner and you will therefore believe that “most people can be trusted.” Tyler (1990, chs. 4, 5) argues that people respect the law because they believe that the
    
    Uslaner, “Trust and Corruption” (6) justice system is fair and that they have been treated fairly. The key to less corruption–and more trust–then, is an effective system of property rights and the rule of law (Lambsdorff, 1999; Leite and Weidemann, 1999, 20, 23; Treisman, 2000). The “rotting fish” account sees corruption as an a plague on the ordinary citizen imposed by selfish and unaccountable leaders. The “rotting fish” account stresses empowering the people, through free elections, independent media, and structural reforms to bring government closer to the people (Adsera, Boix, and Payne, 2000; Brunetti and Weder, 1999; Fisman and Gatti, 2000; Treisman, 2000). In contrast to the “rotting fish” argument, the “raccomandazione” thesis emphasizes how corruption is part of the larger culture. Raccomandazione is the Italian practice of soliciting favors from people in high places (what Plunkitt would call “honest graft”). In October, 2000, the director of a civil court in Southern Italy received 88 pounds of fish in return for helping to expedite the case of a plaintiff. A lower court convicted the director of corruption, but a higher court overruled the verdict. The director could only be convicted of pretending to influence higher authorities; punishment would be warranted only if the official couldn’t deliver. Even direct evidence of pay-offs (what New York Times reporter Alessandra Stanley, 2001, called “squid pro quo”) was insufficient to convict. This case is surely exceptional. Courts do not generally (if ever) enforce corrupt deals. The case was not unique: Raccomodazione “is by now so deeply rooted in our culture that most people believe it is an indispensable tool when seeking even that to which they are entitled,” a court wrote in 1992 as it overturned yet another conviction for influence peddling (Stanley, 2001). Yet, courts don’t need to ratify agreements. Turning a blind eye may be sufficient:
    
    Uslaner, “Trust and Corruption” (7) Former Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti was acquitted in 1999 of a charge he tried to influence the Mafia; a judge in Palermo postponed a new trial, arguing that the court had more important business. And the curse of corruption in Central and Eastern Europe is the moral ambivalence that ordinary citizens develop toward those who exploit them. When doctors demand “gift payments” for basic medical treatment, as most do, Hungarians shrug their shoulders and cast no moral judgment (Kornai, 2000, 3,7, 9). The raccomodazione account emphasizes that corruption is ingrained into the political culture of a society. Italian society has traditionally been marked by low levels of generalized trust (Almond and Verba, 1960) and high levels of particularized trust, and these strong in-group ties are the foundation for the Mafia’s ring of corruption (Gambetta, 1993). These strong ties among an in-group establish bonds of reciprocity that help to sustain a corrupt regime: Corrupt officials need to be sure that their “partners” will deliver on their promises (Lambsdorff, 2002a, 2002b). Lambsdorf (2002a) argues: “...if corrupt deals cannot be enforced, this can act as a deterrent to corruption itself.” So particularized trust may create the same bond among corrupt officials that generalized trust does in the larger society–but with opposite consequences. The message of raccomodazione (as well as “gift payments”) is that you can’t cleanse a polity by replacing its leaders–or even its laws. Laws may set out fierce punishments, as in Italy. Yet, most bad deeds go unpunished (Tanzi, 1998, 574). We can tinker with institutional design and even restructure entire political systems. We can put political leaders in jail. But cultures of corruption will not wither away. An Indian journalist commented on the sharp cleavages that led to a cycle of unstable coalitions, none of which could form a government: “We have the hardware of democracy, but not the software, and that can’t be borrowed or mimicked” (Constable, 1999,
    
    Uslaner, “Trust and Corruption” (8) A19). The history of Paterson, New Jersey and its surrounding county of Passaic points to the futility of reform efforts.2 Paterson and its surrounding county, as most Northeastern industrial areas, for many years was dominated by a corrupt Democratic machine. Reformers in New Jersey sought to “cleanse” Paterson’s political system early in the twentieth century (Norwood, 1974, 52-53): ...when the working class did start to build a power base, it was unceremoniously cut off. By 1907 the longtime practice of city aldermen’s selling jobs on the municipal payroll was so blatant that the New Jersey Legislature established a special form of government solely for the city of Paterson. It revoked the aldermen’s power and left them with only such insignificant duties as licensing dogs, peddlers, and junkyards. The mayor became the single elected official with authority By the middle of the century, Republicans alternated with the Democrats in power. Both the city and the county have been restructured their electoral systems. Yet, six major government or party officeholders and more than a handful of police officers have either been convicted of or face indictment for receiving or demanding kickbacks (The Record, 2001). In 1988, the state of New Jersey took control of the Paterson school system, charging rampant corruption (Lindsay, 1998). Paterson’s history provides little support for a “rotting fish” explanation; as in Italy, corruption seems ingrained into Paterson’s culture. Confidence in the legal system depends upon trust (my view), and not the other way around (as argued by Rothstein and others). Countries with more trusting populations display
    
    Uslaner, “Trust and Corruption” (9) higher support for the legal system. In trusting nations, elites are also more likely to say that the legal system is fair. Yet, there is no corresponding causal link between support for the law and trust in people (Uslaner, 2002, ch. 8).3 So we should expect the same dynamic between trust and corruption. It would be nice if we could clean up corruption and thereby boost trust in our fellow citizens. If the roots of corruption lie in a culture of mistrust, then the task becomes much more daunting. The Roots of Corruption and Trust What, then, are the roots of corruption and trust? Does corruption lead to less trust–or does mistrust of others lead to less corruption? Trust is easy to measure. There is a standard question, “Generally speaking, do you believe that most people can be trusted, or can’t you be too careful in dealing with people?” In Uslaner (2002, ch. 3) I show that this question does reflect moral trust, especially trust in strangers. I used the most recent value available in the World Values Surveys for 1981, 1990, and 1995 (see Uslaner, 2002, 225, n. 6 for a discussion of the surveys; and 230 for the rationale for excluding countries with communist legacies from much of the analysis below). I primarily employ the Transparency International estimate of corruption for 1998. 4 Each country’s score comes from a “poll of polls” business executives and the public, as well as rankings by risk analysts and experts on the politics and economics of each country (Treisman, 2000). The ratings range from zero (most corrupt) to 10 (least corrupt). I estimated statistical models for trust and corruption to examine the roots of each–and to see in particular what the interaction between the two is. I employed two-stage least squares, which permits me to examine reciprocal causation. The model for trust is based upon the
    
    Uslaner, “Trust and Corruption” (10) arguments in Uslaner (2002, ch. 8). The model for trust is simple: It includes corruption, the percent Catholic, and the level of economic inequality. Inglehart (1997, 95) has found that countries with large shares of Catholics are less trusting, perhaps attributable to the hierarchical structure of authority in the Church. I have argued above that trust depends upon an equitable distribution of wealth, so I use the Gini indices reported in Deininger and Squire (1996). The model for corruption includes five independent variables, some of which have not been investigated in previous studies. The motivating force behind this model is to put the “rotting fish” and racomandazione models to the test. Does corruption lead to less trust, or does trust lead to less corruption? Is there an institutional fix to the problem of corruption? Does democratization lead to greater honesty in government? Or is democracy merely a shell into which the raw stuff of political culture must be molded? My model for corruption does not include many variables in the literature; I tested for them, but none were significant once I entered trust and other predictors in my estimations. Once trust entered the equation for corruption, I did not find significant relationships for the level of public sector wages (LaPorta et al., 1998; Mauro, 1997, 5; Tanzi, 1998, 573; Treisman, 2000; but cf. Rose-Ackerman, 1978, 90-91), per capita income or gross domestic product (Lambsdorff, 1999, 7; Mauro, 1995, 701; 1998, 13; Paldam, 2000, 9); the size of the unofficial economy (Lambsdorff,1999); the level of newspaper readership (Adsera, Boix, and Payne, 2000); federal versus unitary governments or the share of government revenues spent at the local level (Treisman, 1998; Fisman and Gatti, 2000); ethnolingusitic diversity (Treisman, 2000); or the level of political stability (Leite and Weidmann, 1999, 20; Treisman, 2000).
    
    Uslaner, “Trust and Corruption” (11) Generalized trust is the main variable of interest in the model. Also in the model are: the level of tariffs (from the Barro-Lee data set); a measure of how extensive property rights are in a country (from LaPorta et al., 1997); the Freedom House index summarizing the level of democratic freedoms in a country;5 and the average score from the World Values Survey measuring how strongly people believe that the devil exists. Closed markets present great opportunities for corruption. Countries that maintain open markets will limit the opportunities for corruption (Leite and Weidmann, 1999, 20; Treisman, 2000). Free societies give citizens more power to monitor governments and to hold them accountable. Societies with a free press, e.g., make it more difficult for elites to get away with corrupt behavior (Adsera, Boix, and Payne, 2000; Brunetti and Weder, 1999; Treisman, 2000). A strong system of property rights makes it difficult for politicians to expropriate people’s wealth (Leite and Weidmann, 1999, 20). Belief in the devil is the religiosity variable with the most robust connections to corruption. The trust and religiosity variables reflect the raccomandazione argument. Trust and religiosity are values that shape the underlying culture of a society (cf. Husted, 1999). If corruption largely depends upon cultural values, then there is little that we can do to reduce malfeasance, at least in the short run. On the other hand, freedom, property rights, and tariffs are more malleable. So it may be possible to reduce corruption through appropriate reforms in the constitutional or political structure of a country–or even by reshaping policies. The estimates for both trust and corruption in Table 1 suggest that corruption has both cultural and structural roots. The most powerful effects are for the cultural variables. The countries in this sample have corruption scores ranging from 1.9 (most corrupt) to 10 (least
    
    Uslaner, “Trust and Corruption” (12) corrupt). Moving from the least to the most trusting society changes trust from by 4.278 points, according to the corruption regression–more than half the total distance in this sample. Belief in the devil has the same general effect, moving corruption 4.298 points. The structural/policy variables have weaker effects. Moving from the least to the most free country leads less corruption (by 2.376 points on the scale), while countries with the greatest protection for property rights have substantially less corruption (by 3.75 points). More open markets do lead to less corruption, but the effect is modest. Following Treisman (2000), I find only a minuscule effect for free trade on corruption. _________________ Table 1 about here Societies with more economic inequality and with larger shares of Catholics are less trusting. However, the biggest impact on trust comes from corruption. The roots of corruption stem from below, but those of trust may be top-down. Corrupt officials may indeed lead people to believe that other ordinary citizens cannot be trusted. Or does it? The results in Table 1 come from a cross-sectional analysis that is static. The big impact of freedom on corruption occurs for the countries with strong democratic traditions (scores below 4.0 on the Freedom House scale). But these are already the least corrupt countries. The most corrupt countries also are the least free (mean corruption score = 6.7 for countries scoring 4 or above). But across these countries, including many recent democracies, there is virtually no correlation between corruption and freedom. The situation doesn’t look much better when I examine the relationship between corruption and change in the Freedom House scores from 1978 to 1998. If we are seek to rid countries
    
    Uslaner, “Trust and Corruption” (13) of corruption, we need to know which factors produce change. There are two ways in which one can overcome this problem. First, I shall focus on changes in the potential causes of corruption: Is there less corruption in countries that have become more democratic? Second, I focus on changes in corruption and changes in the potential causes of democracy. Focusing on change leads to difficult estimations. Countries that already rank very highly on freedom have little room to move further. For the advanced industrial nations,6 70 percent already had the rating of most free and the remaining 30 percent were at the next level (scores of 2 and 3 respectively). The first group of countries (the United States, Canada, and most of Western Europe) cannot become more democratic; the second group cannot become much more democratic. To ensure that I do not confound the already free countries with those where structural reforms might do some good, I restrict the analysis to the 14 countries ranking above 4 on the Freedom House scale in 1998. There is a very weak correlation (r2 = .119) between the 1998 corruption score from TI and change in the level of democratization. So the long march to democracy did not seem to produce less corruption over the past two decades. And virtually the entire positive relationship between honesty in government and democratization is traceable to one country–Chile. When I plot the relationship without Chile, the correlation drops to virtually zero. Making countries more democratic does not seem to make them less corrupt. And we see a similar dynamic for countries below the mean in trust. For the countries that have surveys on trust in both the first (1981) and second (1990-95) waves of the World Values Survey, I computed change in trust scores. The logic here is that countries with low levels of trust that became more trusting should also become less corrupt.
    
    Uslaner, “Trust and Corruption” (14) Yet, there is relatively little change in trust over time. The correlation of trust indicators across the 22 nations for which we have data in both the first and second waves is .906 and the regression coefficient for 1981 trust on 1990 trust is 1.022– indicating only the slightest upward blip over time. Second, for the small number of countries with low trust in 1981 (N = 10), there is no relationship (r2 = .000) between change in trust and the corruption index. Corruption is stable as well, but not quite as uniform over time as trust. The simple correlation between corruption in the 1980-85 measure and the 1998 estimate is .816, and the regression coefficient is .825, indicating a trend toward less corruption over time. In Figure 1 I plot the relationship between changes in trust and corruption for the 18 countries for which there are data on both variables over time. Countries that became more trusting (Mexico and Italy, in particular) became less corrupt and countries that became less trusting showed an increase in corruption (Argentina, South Africa, and France, in particular). The relationship is moderate ( r2 = .227), but it is robust (see below). There is more variation in the the Freedom House measures of democratization over time: the correlation between the 1978 and 1998 scores is just .463 (N = 64). Yet democratization does not go hand in hand with more honesty. The plot of change in corruption and change in democratization is rather weak ( r2 = .022). Hungary, Poland, and the Phillippines have all become more democratic and less corrupt, but democratization only seems to have heightened the lack of transparency in Russia, South Africa, and the Czech Republic. _________________ Figure 1 about here I examine the reciprocal relationship between change in trust and change in corruption in
    
    Uslaner, “Trust and Corruption” (15) Table 2. Note again that the number of cases is very small, but the results are stable. I am strongly constrained in the choice of variables that might be theoretically relevant because the dependent variables are changes. I am not trying to explain trust or corruption, but changes in trust and changes in corruption. What seems theoretically relevant for the simple aggregate levels may not be so important for changes. ________________ Table 2 about here The equation for trust includes change in corruption, growth in trade from 1970 to 1990, and change in the gross domestic product (GDP) from 1980 to 1990 (from the Penn World Tables). The change in corruption equation includes changes in trust and freedom as well as the change in imports from 1980 to 1990 (from the Penn World Tables), and ethnolinguistic diversity. The estimates in Table 2 exclude Hungary, the only country with a legacy of Communism that had values on trust in both 1981 and 1990. There may be good reason to include changes in GDP in the change in corruption equation as well: When countries become richer, their citizens may feel less need to seek gains through corruption. I did not include changes in GDP for two reasons: First, with such a small number of cases, adding extra variables is hazardous. But, more critically, adding changes in GDP to the corruption change equation induces considerable collinearity with the other predictors. Two things stand out from the results in Table 2. First, there seem to be many paths to reducing corruption. There are significant relationships between change in corruption for change in trust, change in freedom, change in the level of imports, and ethnolinguistic diversity. Expanding markets and democratization seem to bring less corruption. Countries with more
    
    Uslaner, “Trust and Corruption” (16) diverse populations became more corrupt: Each ethnic group might look out for its own welfare, reinforcing particularizing trust. And, of course, change in trust matters. The overall impacts are roughly equal for each variable, though the largest seems to be for democratization. Now this seems rather curious. The relationship between change in corruption and democratization is very weak in simple bivariate relationships (without Hungary, the simple r2 falls to .007). The significant coefficients in the corruption equation seem to stem from collinearity among change in freedom, change in imports, and ethnolinguistic diversity. When I eliminate any of these three variables, the others fall to insignificance, leaving only change in trust as a significant predictor of changes in corruption. Second, change in corruption is not a significant predictor of change in trust. Increases in trade modestly increases trust, while there is a weak negative relationship between change in GDP and trust. Yet, the direction of the relationship between trust and corruption goes one way–from trust to corruption. This is strong support for the bottom up thesis. You can’t get rid of corruption by structural change or even by replacing one elite with another. The strongest determinant of change in corruption is change in trust. Neither changes very readily and this makes assaults on corruption more difficult. Practices such as raccomandazione rest upon a set of cultural norms. The Consequences of Corruption Students of corruption have compiled a laundry list of the negative consequences of corruption. Corrupt countries should have higher rates of theft and tax evasion (cf. LaPorta et al., 1998). Corruption should also lead to higher rates of business regulation; regulations can serve to restrict markets and extract extralegal payments from investors. Dishonest governments might
    
    Uslaner, “Trust and Corruption” (17) also need to have higher marginal tax rates to compensate for revenues extracted by the leadership. Corruption should also slow economic growth (Leite and Weidemann, 1999; Mauro, 1995, 701; Tanzi, 1998, 585; but cf. Poirson, 1998, 14). Corruption reduces the amount of money available for various government programs, including the government share of the gross domestic product and expenditures on the public sector, for education, and transfers from the rich to the poor (Mauro, 1998a, 269; Tanzi, 1998, 582-586). Corrupt governments also tend to be less efficient and less stable (see Mauro, 1995; LaPorta et al., 1998; Treisman, 2000). And they should especially be less responsive to the public will (Adsera, Boix, and Payne, 2000). So what shapes respect for the law and good governance? Is it honesty or trust? It is difficult to separate the effects of the two variables, since they are highly correlated ( r = .724, N = 47). Nevertheless, I shall try to do so. In Table 3, I present estimates of the effects of trust and corruption for 14 measures of social and governmental performance and public policies. I estimated the equations by two-stage least squares with three equations for each performance measure, one for trust, one for corruption, and the third for the indicator in question. Corruption and trust were included as endogenous variables separately in each performance measure equation. The other two equations (for trust and corruption are identical to those in Table 1). The other variables in the performance measures were the 1998 Freedom House score, 1990 per capita income (from the Penn World Tables), and Vanhanen’s (1997) measure of knowledge diversity, a generalized indicator of the scope of education in a society. I seek to answer whether corruption or trust has an impact on these measures of performance. Then, recognizing that multicollinearity can depress or inflate the effects of both predictors, and even change signs, I include both trust and corruption as predictors of performance. The performance measures and
    
    Uslaner, “Trust and Corruption” (18) their sources are listed in Table 3.7 The entries in the table are the significance levels of the regression coefficients. ________________ Table 3 about here Clearly Mauro and Rothstein are on to something. Countries with high levels of corruption also have high rates of theft and tax evasion. Trust is marginally significant for tax evasion, while tax evasion very strongly tracks the level of corruption in society. People see corrupt regimes and believe that it is acceptable to steal and especially to withhold their taxes. Otherwise their hard-earned money would go directly into the pockets of the politicians. Corruption does shape one measure of the growth rate (mean yearly GDP growth), but not another. It does lead to fewer public expenditures on the public sector or on education, to less political stability, a less efficient judiciary, more red tape in the bureaucracy, and to a less responsive government. But neither trust nor corruption has any effect on the top marginal tax rate, the government’s share of the gross domestic product, or on transfer expenditures (though see LaPorta, 1997; and Uslaner, 2002, ch. 8). Trust does not seem to affect obedience to the law in the aggregate analyses, although there is a weak connection to tax evasion. There are no significant ties between trust and tax rates or bureaucratic regulations. Nor does trust seem to lead to greater growth (but see LaPorta et al., 1997; and Uslaner, 2002, ch. 8). Yet, trust does seem to matter, generally more than corruption, for governmental expenditures, for political stability, and for the overall quality of government. When I put trust and corruption in the same equation, corruption seems to matter more
    
    Uslaner, “Trust and Corruption” (19) for adherence to the law and for red tape in the bureaucracy. Most of the time, it is trust that matters most. Trusting governments, more than honest governments, spend a greater share of their gross domestic product on government, spend more for education and on the public sector more generally, and have better functioning judiciaries and greater political stability. Reprise Some of these findings are not very surprising. Since trust links us to others in society who are different from ourselves, we might expect that trusting societies would spend more on government programs that raise standards of living for the less well-off. Putnam (1993, 111-115), LaPorta et al. (1997), and Uslaner (2002, ch. 8) have also linked social trust to governments that perform well and redistribute resources from the rich to the poor, as well to higher economic growth. Cooperative societies will have better performing economies (cf. Knack and Keefer, 1997). Trust, not honesty, seems to produce better government performance, more redistribution, and economic growth. Corruption, rather than mistrust, seems to lead people to break or evade the law. Corrupt bureaucracies get mired in red tape. Yet, judicial efficiency seems more rooted in trust than in corruption. To reduce corruption, you need to increase trust. Trust changes slowly in most countries. Trust depends upon an egalitarian distribution of wealth in a society, and economic inequality is almost as stubbornly stable as trust (the correlation between the Gini indices for 1980 and 1990 is .827 for a sample of 47 nations). You can’t increase trust by removing dishonest leaders and replacing them with a new set of elites, as the case of Paterson, New Jersey indicates. Reforming the institutions of a corrupt political system did not lead to less corruption almost a century later.
    
    Uslaner, “Trust and Corruption” (20) As the American baseball player, Yogi Berra, once said: “It’s deja vu all over again.”8 Culture, including the culture of corruption, changes slowly, if at all.
    
    Uslaner, “Trust and Corruption” (21) Table 1 Simultaneous Equation Estimation for Trust and Corruption
    
    Coefficient Trust equation Corruption Gini coefficient Percent Catholic Constant Corruption equation Trust Freedom Property rights Belief in devil Tariffs Constant .069** -.198** 1.250** .851** -21.127** .715 3.393**** -31.894* -.126*** 32.363**
    
    Standard Error
    
    t Ratio
    
    .803 23.855 .043 11.519
    
    4.23 -1.33 -2.92 2.81
    
    .029 .108 .464 .340 11.687 2.160
    
    2.39 -1.83 2.69 2.50 -1.81 .33
    
    **** p < .0001 *** p < .001 ** p < .05 * p < .01
    
    N = 23 For trust equation: RMSE = 7.769; F = 16.051, estimated R2 = .725 For corruption equation: RMSE = 1.033; F = 21.206, estimated R2 = .863
    
    Uslaner, “Trust and Corruption” (22) Table 2 Simultaneous Equation Estimation for Changes in Trust and Corruption for Countries Without Legacy of Communism
    
    Coefficient Change in Trust equation Change in corruption Growth in trade Change in GDP 1980-1990 Constant Change in Corruption equation Change in trust Change in freedom Change in imports Ethnolinguistic diversity Constant 14.233** .285** .084** -2.984** -1.064 -.002 .043** -.148 .099**
    
    Standard Error
    
    t Ratio
    
    .017 .018 .106 .033
    
    -.11 2.36 -1.39 3.01
    
    7.543 .150 .047 1.709 .680
    
    1.89 1.90 1.78 -1.75 -1.57
    
    **** p < .0001 *** p < .001 ** p < .05 * p < .01
    
    N = 18 For change in trust equation: RMSE = .043; F = 4.616, estimated R2 = .490 For change in corruption equation: RMSE = 1.187; F = 3.020, estimated R2 = .488
    
    Uslaner, “Trust and Corruption” (23) Table 3 Effects of Trust and Corruption on Political and Economic Performance
    Indicator (source) Theft rate (Lederman) Tax evasion (LaPorta) Business regulations (LaPorta) Top marginal tax rate (LaPorta) GDP growth rate (Diener) Mean yearly GDP growth 1980-1990 (Fedderke ) Government share of GDP (LaPorta) Public sector expenditures (LaPorta) Education expenditures (LaPorta) Transfer expenditures (LaPorta) Political stability (Mauro) Judicial efficiency (Mauro) Red tape in bureaucracy (Mauro) Govt responds to will of people (Gallup survey) * *** **** * **** p < .0001 *** p < .001 ** p < .05 * p < .01 ** **** ** Trust** Corrupt*** Knowledge diversity Knowledge diversity 22 22 21 ** ** *** ** ** Trust** Trust** Trust* 1990 per capita income Trust** Corruption ** *** ** * Corrupt** Corrupt** ** ** **** ** 22 21 23 Knowledge diversity Trust Corruption vs. Trust Freedom Significant Variables 1990 per capita income 1990 per capita income knowledge diversity Knowledge diversity N 14 22 23 23 22 23
    
    Uslaner, “Trust and Corruption” (24)
    
    Figure 1
    
    Uslaner, “Trust and Corruption” (25) REFERENCES Adsera, Alicia, Carles Boix, and Mark Payne 2000, Are You Being Served? Political Accountability and Quality of Government, Washington: Inter-American Development Bank Research Department Working Paper # 438. Almond, Gabriel and Sidney Verba. 1960. The Civic Culture. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Brunetti, Aymo and Beatrice Weder 1999, A Free Press Is Bad News for Corruption, Unpublished paper, University of Basel, Switzerland. Constable, Pamela 1999, India’s Democracy In Uncertain Health, Washington Post (April 21): A17, A19. Deininger, Klaus and Lyn Squire 1996, A New Data Set: Measuring Economic Income Inequality, World Bank Economic Review, 10:565-592. Diener, Ed 1995, A Value Based Index for Measuring National Quality of Life, Social Indicators Research, 36:107-127. Fisman, Raymond and Roberta Gatti 2000, Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence Across Countries, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. Fukayama, Francis 1995, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, New York: Free Press. Gambetta, Diego 1993, The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Husted, Bryan W 1999, Wealth, Culture, and Corruption, Journal of International Business Studies, 30:339-360.
    
    Uslaner, “Trust and Corruption” (26) Inglehart, Ronald 1997, Modernization and Postmodernization, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Knack, Stephen and Philip Keefer 1997, Does Social Capital Have An Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112:1251-1288. Kornai, Janos. 2000. “Hidden in an Envelope: Gratitude Payments to Medical Doctors in Hungary,” at http://www.colbud.hu/honesty-trust/kornai/pub01.PDF Lambsdorff, Johann Graf 1999, Corruption in Empirical Research–A Review, Transparency International Working Paper, available at http://wwwtransparencyde/workingpapershtml/lambsdorff_eresearchhtml, accessed March 23, 2001 ____________________ 2002a, What Nurtures Corrupt Deals? On the Role of Confidence and Transaction Costs, In D. della Porta and S. Rose-Ackerman, eds., Corrupt Exchanges, Nomos Verlag: Baden Baden, Germany ____________________ 2002b, How Confidence Facilitates Illegal Transactions, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol 61 (4), 2002, pp 829-854. Lancaster, Thomas D. and Gabriella R. Montinola In press, Comparative Political Corruption: Issues of Operationalization and Measurement, Studies in Comparative International Development. LaPorta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-Silanes, Andrei Schleifer, and Robert W. Vishney 1997, Trust in Large Organizations, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 87:333-38. ___________________1998, The Quality of Government, Unpublished ms., Harvard University. Leite, Carlos and Jens Weidmann 1999, Does Mother Nature Corrupt? Natural Resources, Corruption, and Economic Growth? Washington: International Monetary Fund Working
    
    Uslaner, “Trust and Corruption” (27) Paper WP/99/85. Levi, Margaret 1998, A State of Trust, In Margaret Levi and Valerie Braithwaite, eds., Trust and Governance, New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Lindsay, Drew 1998, After a Lengthy Court Fight, Thee’s Still No Sign of a Consensus on How to Improve Urban Schools, http://www.edweek.org/sreports/qc98/states/nj-n2.htm, accessed May 19, 2001. Macaulay, Stewart 1963, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, American Sociological Review, 28:55-67. Mauro, Paolo 1995, Corruption and Growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110:681-712. __________ 1997, Why Worry About Corruption? Washington: International Monetary Fund. ____________ 1998a Corruption and the Composition of Government Expenditure, Journal of Public Economics, 69:263-279 ____________ 1998b Corruption: Causes, Consequences, and Agenda for Further Research, Finance and Development (International Monetary Fund), March: 11-14. Misztal, Barbara A. 1996, Trust in Modern Societies, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Norwood, Christopher 1974, About Paterson, New York: Harper Colophon. Offe, Claus 1996, Social Capital: Concepts and Hypotheses, Humboldt University (Germany). Onishi, Norimitsu with Neela Banerjee 2001, Chad’s Wait for Its Oil Riches May Be Long, New York Times (May 16), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/16/world/16CHAD.html, accessed May 17, 2001. Putnam, Robert D. 1993, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Unpublished manuscript,
    
    Uslaner, “Trust and Corruption” (28) Princeton: Princeton University Press. Paldam, Martin 2000. The Cross-Country Pattern of Corruption. Unpublished ms, University of Aarhus. Poirson, Helene 1998, Economic Security, Private Investment, and Growth in Developing Countries, Washington: International Monetary Fund Working Paper WP/98/4. The Record 2001, Fava's Big Challenge: Wanted: A New Type of Passaic County Sheriff, editorial, http://www.bergen.com/editorials/fava200103292.htm, accessed May 19, 2001. Riordan, William 1948, Plunkitt of Tammany Hall, New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Rose-Ackerman, Susan 1978, Corruption: A Study in Political Economy, New York: Academic Press. Rothstein, Bo 2000, Trust, Social Dilemmas, and Collective Memories: On the Rise and Decline
    
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    Uslaner, “Trust and Corruption” (30) NOTES * This paper is based upon many of the ideas in Uslaner (2002) and reflects extensive conversations with Bo Rothstein and Martin Paldam as well as comments by Johan Graf Lambsdorff, Markus Taube, and other participants at the Conference on “Corrupt Transactions Exploring the Analytical Capacity of Institutional Economics,” University of Göttingen, Göttingen, Germany, November 15-16 2002. I am particularly grateful to the Center for International Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland, the General Research Board of the University of Maryland, the Russell Sage Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation, and the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences for support for writing this paper. I am also grateful to Johannes Fedderke, Ronald Inglehart, Rafael LaPorta, and Daniel Treisman for providing me with data. Some of the data I employ were made possible by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, which is not responsible for any interpretations I have made. 1. I shall discuss the measures of trust and corruption below. For now it is sufficient to note that the simple correlation between the two aggregated measures across 47 countries is .724. 2. The choice of Paterson, New Jersey is not accidental. I was born and raised there and my father lived and breathed its politics. An alderman is the equivalent of a city council member. 3. The data were estimated by two-stage least squares using aggregated measures of trust in people and confidence in the legal system from the World Values Surveys (see below) and
    
    Uslaner, “Trust and Corruption” (31) a measure of fairness of the legal system. The latter measure was developed by the Institute for Management Development in Lausanne, Switzerland surveys business executives on their “confidence in the fair administration of justice in society” (published in the Institute’s World Competitiveness Yearbook and reported in Treisman, 1999, 18). 4. The data on corruption (for 1998) come from the global organization Transparency International and are found on its web site, at http://www.transparency.de/documents/cpi/index.html. 5. The Freedom House scores are for 1998 and are taken from: http://www.freedomhouse.org /rankings.pdf. The Freedom House web site contains scores for both political and civil liberties. They were very highly correlated, so I summed the two (cf. Inglehart, 1997, 357). 6. As determined by the log of GDP per capita adjusted for comparative purchasing power (PPP) in the Penn World Tables. Advanced industrial countries (N = 20) had scores above 4.0. 7. Sources from LaPorta are reported in LaPorta et al. (1997, 1998) and provided by Rafael LaPorta; the source from Lederman is provided by Daniel Lederman of the World Bank; Diener is from Diener (1995), Mauro from Mauro (1995); Fedderke from Johannes Fedderke; and Gallup survey from Daniel Treisman. 8. See http://www.yogi-berra.com/yogiisms.html. Accessed May 23, 2001.

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