"All for All: Equality and Social Trust" (with Bo Rothstein)

World Politics, 2005

Trust, Diversity, and Segregation

Generalized trust is a value that leads to many positive outcomes for a society–greater tolerance of minorities, greater levels of volunteering and giving to charity, better functioning government, less corruption, more open markets, and greater economic growth.  Generalized trust is faith in people you don’t know who are likely to be different from yourself.  Yet, several people, most notably Robert Putnam, now argue that trust is lower when we are surrounded by people who are different from ourselves.  This view is mistaken.  Diversity (fractionalization) is not the culprit in lower levels of trust.  Instead, it is residential segregation–which isolates people from those who may be of a different background.  Segregation is one of the key reasons why contact with people who are different from ourselves does not lead to greater trust: Such contact may not be so frequent and it is not likely to take place frequently and in an atmosphere of equality, as argued by Allport, Forbes, and Pettigrew.  I show that residential segregation does lower generalized trust cross-nationally–and that inequality seems to have a stronger effect when segregation is high.  I also estimate a hierarchical model of trust cross-nationally and show that residential segregation drives down trust across nations.  I also show that people who live in integrated neighborhoods and who have diverse social networks are more likely to be trusting, using the Social Capital Benchmark Survey and the Knight Community Indicators Survey.  I argue that measures of diversity are surrogate measures for the shares of minorities living in a community: We know that minorities are less trusting so it is the racial and ethnic composition of a community, rather than the level of diversity, that seems to drive down trust.

""Where You Stand Depends Upon Where Your Grandparents Sat: The Inheritability of Generalized Trust”

Public Opinion Quarterly, 2008

Generalized trust is a stable value that is transmitted from parents to children.  Do its roots go back further in time?  Using a person’s ethnic heritage (where their grandparents came from) and the proportion of people of different ethnic backgrounds in a state, I ask whether your own ethnic background matters more than whom you live among.  People whose grandparents came to the United States from countries that have high levels of trust (Nordics, and the British)  tend to have higher levels of generalized trust (using the General Social Survey from 1972 to 1996).  People living in states with high German or British populations (but not Nordic populations) are also more trusting (using state-level census data).  Italians, Latinos, and African-Americans also tend to have lower levels of trust, but it is not clear that country of origin can account for these negative results.  Overall, there are effects for both culture (where your grandparents came from) and experience (which groups you live among), but the impact of ethnic heritage seem stronger.

"Does Diversity Drive Down Trust?"

forthcoming in Per Selle and Sanjeev Prakash, eds., Civil Society, the State and Social Capital: Theory, Evidence, Policy (London: Routledge)

There are different forms of diversity that might matter (or not matter) for trust and that much of the existing literature does not make this distinction well. I examine a wide range of measures of diversity and fractionalization cross-nationally as well as survey evidence and find that only one measure of diversity matters: Countries where minority populations are segregated from the majority are less trusting.

‘‘Bands of Others’’? Attitudes toward Muslims in Contemporary American Society" with Kerem Ozan Kalkan and Geoffrey C. Layman

Journal of Politics, 71, July 2009, 1-16

The obvious explanation for the unpopularity of Muslims in contemporary American society centers on the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001. However, we contend that feelings about Muslims are shaped primarily by a general
sense of affect for groups that fall outside of the cultural mainstream and the personality and value orientations
typically associated with such affect. Thus, the current structure of Muslim evaluations should not differ much from
that before the 9/11 attacks. Moreover, Muslims may be distinctive in that, unlike most minority groups, they are
associated with both positively viewed racial and religious minority groups and with negatively viewed cultural
minority groups. Analyses of data from the 2004 American National Election Study and other surveys conducted
between 2000 and 2007 strongly support our argument.

(with Mark Lichbach): " "Israel and Evangelicals: The Two Front War for Jewish Votes."

fortcoming in Religion and Politics, December, 2009

We pose a familiar question--why American Jews continue to vote Democratic when most other groups in the New Deal coalition have become less loyal to the Democratic party.  Traditional explanations focus on the liberalism of American Jews.  We provide support for this argument, but argue that an increasingly important reason for the loyalty of Jews to the Democratic party is fear of evangelicals, who have become more powerful in American society and especially within the Republican party.  Non-Jews were did not base their vote choices on attitudes toward fundamentalists.  For non-Jews views of the Christian Right were tied in closely to other culture war issues (ideology, abortion, gay unions, and gun control)--while for Jews, attitudes toward evangelicals were more of an issue of identity than of a culture war over social issues.

Some Jews voted Republican and Jewish Bush voters were distinctive in seeing Israel as the first or second most important issue in the campaign.  We analyze Jewish voting behavior using a survey of American Jews conducted in 2004 for the National Jewish Democratic Council by Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research and we compare our findings with results for non-Jews using the 2004 American National Election Study.

"Trust as a Moral Value"

n Dario Castiglione, Jan W. van Deth, and Guglielmo Wolleb, eds., Handbook of Social Capital (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 101-121

The paper is short and non-technical: I focus on the different types of trust (generalized trust, particularized trust, strategic trust) and discuss whether--and how--government might shape trust.

"Tax Evasion, Corruption, and the Social Contract in Transition"

forthcoming in James Alm, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, and Benno Torgler, eds., Tax Compliance and Tax Evasion (London: Routledge)

Why do businesspeople pay taxes?  I use the Business Enterprise and Environment Performance Surveys (BEEPS) conducted for the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in 2002 and 2005 to examine this question.  Both firm-level and aggregate analyses indicate that businesses are most likely to evade taxation if they believe that the level of corruption is high and if they see the level of public services as unsatisfactory.  High levels of trust lead to greater tax compliance, while increasing economic inequality leads to more tax evasion.

"The Civil State: Trust, Polarization, and the Quality of State Government"

in Jeffrey Cohen, ed., Public Opinion in State Politics (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 142-162

I examine the link between generalized trust and the performance of government in the American states.  Using measures from the Government Performance Project of Governing magazine and the Maxwell School of Citizenship at
Syracuse University, the Ford Foundation/Kennedy School awards for government performance, and measures of corruption in the states (from reporters' perceptions), I find generally strong linkages between trust and government performance--especially for corruption.  Legislative polarization also leads to less effective state government, though there is less evidence that mass polarization matters.

“Comparative Legislative Behavior"

with Thomas Zittel in R.A.W. Rhodes, Sarah Binder, and Bert Rockman, eds., Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions (Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 455-473.

We examine the institutional and cultural roots of legislative behavior in comparative perspective, focusing on comparisons between the United States and Europe.  How much of the differences in partisanship can be explained by the different institutional structures (parliamentary system versus Congressional system) of European and American legislatures?  How can we reconcile such accounts with the strong increase in partisanship in the United States over time?  Here we stress the contribution of the theory of conditional party government.

"The Responsible Congressional Electorate: Watergate, the Economy, and Vote Choice in 1974"

with M.Margaret Conway, American Political Science Review, 79, September, 1985

Scholars have failed to find a link between voters' reactions to Watergate and their vote choice in the 1974 elections.  Using the 1972-74 panel, we find that switchers (as opposed to "standpatters" who chose the same party in both elections) were motivated by attitudes toward Watergate and the economy.

“Political Parties and Social Capital, Political Parties or Social Capital”

in Richard S. Katz and William Crotty, eds., Handbook of Political Parties (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2006), pp. 376-386

Political parties do not (and perhaps ought not) to encourage civic participation in party activities.  Nor do they lead to greater trust in fellow citizens.  Parties are organizations for winning elections and too much participation can make this task difficult.

The Foundations of Trust: Macro and Micro

Cambridge Journal of Economics, 2008, 32

Sjoerd Beugelsdijk argued in an article in the Cambridge Journal of Economics that trust should be measured differently at the macro- and micro levels.  At the macro level, he argues, trust is simply a surrogate for institutional quality.  I argue that macro and micro measures of trust should reflect the same underlying concept--and this is not institutional quality.  I challenge his theory and his measurements. 

Trust, Civic Engagement, and the Internet

Political Communication,  21:223–242, 2004

Does the Internet promote or impede social connections and trust? Using surveys from the Pew Center for the Internet and American Life, I show that Internet users are not social isolates. They tend to have slightly wider social circles than nonusers,
but their Internet communications are largely with people they know. Consequently, it is hardly surprising that Internet users are no more trusting of strangers (but not less trusting either) than nonusers. However, trusting people are more likely to be-
lieve that they have little to fear from the Internet. They are more open to shopping on the Internet and are less likely to believe that their privacy will be violated on the Web; they are also less likely to use a false identity on the Web. The social connections that people make on the Internet do not promote trust—indeed, there is some evidence that chat rooms may bring together mistrusting people.

“Civic Engagement and Particularized Trust: The Ties that Bind People to Their Ethnic Communities

with Richard Conley AMERICAN POLITICS RESEARCH, Vol. 31 No. 4, July 2003 331-360

We argue that not all social connections contribute to social capital as most people have conceived it. People with strong ethnic identifications and who associate primarily with
people of their own kind either will withdraw from civic participation or will belong only to organizations made up of their own nationality. People with looser ties to their in-group are more
likely to take an active role in the larger society. We show the importance of acculturation on broader dimensions of civic engagement by analyzing a Los Angeles Times survey of ethnic Chinese in Southern California in 1997

Divided Citizens: How Inequality Undermines Trust in America

Demos Working Paper 2004

Americans face twin crises of social solidarity. The first is a crisis of declining trust. The
second is one of increasing inequality. This working paper explores how these two prob-
lems are part of the same syndrome. The increasing gap between the rich and the poor
undermines trust and tears at our social fabric. Key points of the paper include:
• The share of Americans who believe that “most people can be trusted” has fallen
from 58 percent the first time the question was asked in a national survey in 1960
to less than 35 percent in 2003.
• Economic inequality in the United States has risen by 17 percent from 1960 to 2002.
The income distribution in the United States has become substantially more unequal
in the last 40 years, and today’s levels of inequality rival those seen in the 1920s.
• Rising inequality leads to mistrust for two reasons. First,
people are less likely to be optimistic and believe that they
can control their own fate in a period of growing inequality.
Growing pessimism and perception of limited resources
leads to a less generous attitudes toward others. Second,
growing inequality weakens social bonds. Trust is based
upon the belief that we are all in this together, part of a “moral community.” It is
tough to convince people in a highly stratified society that the rich and the poor share
common values, much less a common fate.
• Trust is important for creating more generosity and compassion in society. People
who trust others—and see themselves as living in the same moral community with all their fellow citizens—are more likely to be concerned about the misfortunes of strangers. They will seek to better the lives of those who have less, either by favoring government programs to redress grievances or, even more critically, by giving their own time and money.
• Trust is the most important factor shaping giving to human services charities. As Americans’ empathy for people who are different has fallen, we have redirected our
charitable contributions. We give more to charities which directly benefit people like ourselves, such as cultural institutions, and less to charities that help strangers, such
as human service organizations.
Trust is also important for creating greater tolerance. People with faith in others value
diversity within the context of common understandings. Trusters are far less likely
than mistrusters to be suspicious of people who are different from the mainstream
culture. For example, trusters are more supportive of affirmative action and gay rights.
The trend toward growing tolerance in American society in recent decades would
have been stronger if inequality hadn’t been growing at the same time.
• Fostering greater trust in American society requires economic policies to reduce
income inequality.
• Trust can also be strengthened in other ways. Trust rises with more education—and
especially college education. Every study of trust (and every student of trust) finds
powerful effects of education on faith in fellow citizens. Extra years of schooling may
be the most effective way to increase trust.
• Efforts to foster more trust will be most effective when targeted at young people, whose
attitudes remain malleable. Getting youth involved in volunteering is an excellent way
of building trust. So is getting young people to reach out to groups different from them-
selves. Adolescents who have a friend of an opposite race become more trusting adults Trust is also important for creating greater tolerance. People with faith in others value
diversity within the context of common understandings. Trusters are far less likely
than mistrusters to be suspicious of people who are different from the mainstream
culture. For example, trusters are more supportive of affirmative action and gay rights.
The trend toward growing tolerance in American society in recent decades would
have been stronger if inequality hadn’t been growing at the same time.
• Fostering greater trust in American society requires economic policies to reduce
income inequality.
• Trust can also be strengthened in other ways. Trust rises with more education—and
especially college education. Every study of trust (and every student of trust) finds
powerful effects of education on faith in fellow citizens. Extra years of schooling may
be the most effective way to increase trust.
• Efforts to foster more trust will be most effective when targeted at young people, whose
attitudes remain malleable. Getting youth involved in volunteering is an excellent way
of building trust. So is getting young people to reach out to groups different from them-
selves. Adolescents who have a friend of an opposite race become more trusting adults

Corruption, Inequality, and Trust

in  Gert Tinggaard Svendsen and Gunnar Lind Haase Svendsen, eds., Handbook on Social Capital (London: Edward Elgar, 2008)

Nontechnical summary of the "inequality trap" argument in Corruption, Inequality, and the Rule of Law.

"Trust and Corruption"

Johann Graf Lambsdorf, Markus Taube, and Matthias Schramm, eds., Corruption and the New Institutional Economics (London: Routledge, 2004)

First full statement of the linkage between low trust and high levels of corruption--with the notable finding of a linkage between change in trust over time in the World Values Survey and changes in corruption.

Corruption and the Inequality Trap

Prepared for the Conference on Institutions, Behavior, and the Escape from Persistent Poverty, November 16-17, 2009, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY

Corruption is based on a foundation of both economic and legal inequality rather than on “poor” institutions.  I argue that there is an “inequality trap”: High inequality leads to low out-group trust and high in-group trust to greater corruption–and to more inequality.  Even in transition countries, where inequality has been historically low (by official measures), the post-1989 economies have been marked by sharply rising inequality and the persistence of legal inequality.  I show that both economic and legal inequality lead to poor service delivery–which further exacerbates inequality, since the poor are most severely affected by failed public services and have fewer options outside the public sector.

Comparative State Policy Formation, Interparty Competiton, and Malapportionment: A New Look at "V.O. Key's Hypotheses"

Journal of Politics, 40, May, 1978

A large literature in comparative state politics has been devoted to debating whether interparty competition or malapportionment led to more liberal or conservative policy-making in the American states.  I argue that these debates are misplaced since Key's arguments on both interparty competition and apportionment were far more nuanced--and that there have been few systematic attempts to test the more theoretically rigorous hypotheses offered by Key.

The Paradox of Vote Trading: Effects of Decision Rules and Externalities on Vote Trading

with J.Ronnie Davis, American Political Science Review, v. 69: 929-942 (September 1975)

We extend the argument of Riker and Brams on the "paradox of vote trading" to unanimity decision rules and prove that if voters attach equal utility to passage or defeat of legislation, no decision rule can overcome the paradox of vote trading.  However, if the voters attach more utility to the defeat of legislation, then either majority rule with vote trading or a unanimity rule without vote trading will be Pareto optimal.  The paradox of vote trading can only be avoided, more generally, when all legislators agree to trade.

Congressional Behavior and Electoral Marginality

with John L. Sullivan American Journal of Political Science, 22: 536-553 (August 1978)

Are members of Congress from marginal districts more moderate?  Using a survey of members and their opponents of Congress conducted by Congressional Quarterly for NBC News in 1966 and estimating constituency opinion by simulation, we show that members from marginal districts are not more moderate, nor do they converge to the positions of their opponents.  However, members who stray too far from public opinion are more likely to lose than members who are closer to public opinion if their opponents are closer to constituency opinion.  We argue that moderation is not the same thing as proximity to constitutency opinion.

Comity in Context

British Journal of Political Science, 21:45-77 (January 1991)

This paper sets out the argument of my book, The Decline of Comity in Congress (University of Michigan Press, 1993).  Here I examine the increasing incivility in Congress since the 1970s and compare it to the incivility in the pre-Civil War period in the United States.