Books
Segregation and Distrust: Diversity, Isolation, and Social Cohesion
In progress, under advance contract to Cambridge University Press. See prospectus and other papers.
Contrary to recent claims, it is not diversity that drives down trust, but residential segregation, which reduces both trust and altruistic behavior. Concentrated minorities are more likely to develop a strong identity that supercedes a national sense of identification (trust in people who are different from oneself) and to build local institutions and political bodies that enhance this sense of separateness. Geographical isolation may breed in-group identity at the expense of the larger society. Segregation may also lead to greater political organization by minority groups, which can establish their own power bases in opposition to the political organizations dominated by the majority group as their share of the citizenry grows. In diverse settings I find support for a far stronger linkage between segregation and trust than for diversity and trust. And trust has consequences, as I argued in Uslaner (2002), most notably altruistic deeds. I consider not only the roots of trust, but also how diversity and segregation shape volunteering and giving to charity. I employ data from national surveys in the United States, among whites, African-Americans, and Latinos, as well as from the United Kingdom and Sweden, and Canada. I also estimate models using aggregate data from American cities using recently developed measures of residential segregation to support my theoretical claim that segregation creates conditions that should lead to lower trust. Finally, I consider how segregation might lead to either fewer altruistic acts–or to altruistic behavior primarily benefitting one’s own in-group. Segregation, however, is not exogenous: Whites generally prefer to live in white neighborhoods. Minorities may prefer to live in mixed neighborhoods, but often face discrimination in housing and the simple reluctance of whites to live among them. Whites who are more trusting are more likely to favor living in integrated neighborhoods–so the direction of the linkage between trust and segregation may not be so clear, perhaps limiting the impact of integrated neighborhoods on trust.
LikeCorruption, Inequality, and the Rule of Law
Cambridge University Press, 2008
Corruption flouts rules of fairness and gives some people advantages that others don’t have. Corruption is persistent; there is little evidence that countries can escape the curse of corruption easily–or at all. Instead of focusing on institutional reform, Uslaner suggests that the roots of corruption lie in economic and legal inequality and low levels of generalized trust (which are not readily changed) and poor policy choices (which may be more likely to change). Economic inequality provides a fertile breeding ground for corruption–and, in turn, it leads to further inequalities. Just as corruption is persistent, inequality and trust do not change much over time in my cross-national aggregate analyses. Uslaner argues that high inequality leads to low trust and high corruption, and then to more inequality—an inequality trap and identifies direct linkages between inequality and trust in surveys of the mass public and elites in transition countries.
The Moral Foundations of Trust
Cambridge University Press, 2002
Trust makes people more likely to endorse strong standards of moral behavior and to be willing to pay more in taxes to increase government spending (even though they generally don’t favor more spending). Trusters are less likely to say that you should obey a law without questioning it. Trusters believe that the country has a common set of values and that our educational system should be based on the classics.
Generalized trusters believe that ethnic politicians should not serve ethnic interests. Even controlling for their fear of crime, trusters are less likely to lock their doors. They are also less likely tocall in sick for work when they are really well–and more likely to spend time helping relatives. The roots of trust are in an optimistic world view. Trust reflects this outlook more than it does real life economic conditions. And trust has been in decline for over 30 years. The roots of the decline in trust are traceable to declining optimism and increasing economic inequality. I find support for this by aggregate time series in the United States and cross-sectional data across market economies.
Chapter 1 introduces the manuscript. Chapter 2 lays out the difference between strategic and moral trust. Chapter 3 takes care of some measurement issues (including defending the trust question against charges it doesn't measure what it purports to) and also shows that trust is stable over time. Chapter 4 shows that moralistic (generalized) trust doesn't depend upon experience, but on optimism and a sense of control (and comes from one's parents). Chapter 5 examines the purported linkages between informal socializing, membership in civic associations, trust in government, and personal experiences and trust in other people. In virtually every case, both informal socializing and group membership neither produce nor consume trust. The only types of civic activities that are strongly related to trust are volunteering and giving to charity, both of which link us to people who are different from ourselves. Neither trust in government nor trust in people we know leads to generalized trust in strangers. Chapter 6 focuses on how trust changes over time, both for individuals and in the aggregate. As people become more optimistic, they become more trusting. And in particular there are powerful effects for two forms of "collective" experiences, the civil rights movement (which increased trust) and the war in Vietnam (which lowered trust among opponents).
Overall, the biggest single factor that has shaped the decline in trust in the United States is the rise in economic inequality since the 1960s. As inequality has risen, optimism has fallen, and so has trust. Chapter 7 summarizes the consequences of trust. There has been a general decline in many forms of civic engagement, but most (especially informal socializing, group membership, and political participation) are not linked to trust. However, the decline in the share of our national income going to charity (especially charity that benefits people who are different from ourselves), the smaller number of people volunteering for the Red Cross, and volunteer firefighters are all linked to the decline in trust. Trusters are more tolerant of people different from themselves and more willing to support government programs to help people who face discrimination. Chapter 8 is a cross-national examination of trust. As in the United States over time, the strongest determinant of trust cross-nationally for countries without a legacy of Communism is the level of economic equality. Countries with many trusters also have better functioning governments, stronger economic growth, and more open economies. They also pursue policies that redistribute income from the rich to the poor. The epilogue sums it up. And there is also a list of references.
The Moral Foundations of Trust was translated into Chinese and published by Chinese Social Sciences Press in 2007. It was named “Excellent Imported Book of Social Science” by the Chinese Association of Publishers, 2008 and listed as a Modern Classic of Humanities by Fudan University and Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, 2008.
The Movers and the Shirkers: Representatives and Ideologues in the United States Senate
University of Michigan Press, 1999
What is the nature of representation? Why do some legislators seem to pursue their own policy agenda and others only vote for the wishes of a majority in their district? Eric M. Uslaner sheds new light on this important debate, demonstrating that current notions of representation are too narrow and that members of Congress do both pursue a policy agenda and represent their constituents's interests.
Uslaner argues that most representatives do not have to choose between following their ideals or constituency preferences, because voters usually elect public officials who are in tune with their beliefs. And because the constituency is a complex organization of sub-groups—some of which are more critical to achieving re-election than others—the legislator is able to form alliances with those who support the legislator's policy preferences. The views of these groups within the constituence become the views to which the legislator pays most attention. In short, the author argues, politics are both local and ideological.
Uslaner explores the intersection of a legislator ideology and the preferences of various constituencies. In looking at how they interact and how representation affects reelection, the book sheds new light on the place of ideology in American politics.
The Decline of Comity in Congress
University of Michigan Press, 1993
"In the 1950s and 1960s, the Congress was a civil, if not very open, institution. The House was guided by Rayburn's maxim, 'to get along, go along,' while the Senate disdained 'petty exhibitionism' and extolled reciprocity. . . . By the 1980s the House and the Senate came to resemble daycare centers in which colicky babies got their way by screaming at the top of their lungs. . . . While the majority of members still spoke in civil tongues, sanctions did not deter legislators who flouted the rules. In some instances the panoply of shrill voices in the Congress led to stalemate. In other cases it lead to 'bad' policy."
—from Chapter 1
Why do members of Congress resort to name-calling? In this provocative book, Eric M. Uslaner proposes that Congress is mirroring the increased incivility of American society. He points to five core values—American exceptionalism, enlightened individualism, egalitarianism, science as social engineering, and religion—that have been eroded since the 1960s. The author argues that a lack of trust permeates members of Congress to the point that they would rather seek control than compromise. This, Uslaner contends, is the real cause of gridlock in Washington. The Decline in Comity in Congress demonstrates why institutional reform will not correct this problem and why Americans need to change before their government can.
Institutions and Social Order
co-edited with Karol Soltan and Virginia Haufler, University of Michigan Press, 1998
"Institutionalism" is the buzzword of the 1980s and 1990s in the social sciences. What is new in the contemporary analysis of institutions and what does it offer to the study of social order? In this book a distinguished group of social scientists drawn from political science, economics, and sociology, explore this question and show us how different theoretical approaches to institutional analysis can be joined to build a more thorough understanding of institutions.
The modern analysis of institutions has taken two separate paths. Rational choice theories identified institutions as a strategic response to collective action problems and as instruments for the promotion of cooperation. Contrary to these theories, such cooperation is fundamental to social order and a prerequisite for economic growth and development. An alternate form of institutionalism, drawn from sociological and historical analysis, de-emphasized the role of choice, strategy, and design in the construction of many of the major institutions in social life. This form of institutional analysis pointed to the role of prior choices, common norms, and culture in making certain options and choices unthinkable or impossible. Institutions, according to this view, may represent a certain kind of social order, but they do not always promote cooperation and economic growth. The more recent theories in the "new institutionalism" bring these seemingly irreconcilable perspectives closer together. New institutionalists argue that institutions must be grounded in the social fabric, and thus rational choice must be combined with historical and cultural variables. The papers collected in this volume address the merging of rational choice and historical-sociological institutionalism in the "new institutionalism."
The contributors are Randall L. Calvert, Christopher Clague, Kathleen Cook, Peter Hall, Virginia Haufler, James Johnson, Gary Miller, Karol Soltan, Rosemary C. R. Taylor, Eric M. Uslaner, and Barry Weingast.
image Social Capital and Participation in Everyday Life
co-edited with Paul Dekker, Routledge, 2001
From the publisher:
This timely volume puts emphasis on the effect of social capital on everyday life: how the routines of daily life lead people to get involved in their communities. Focussing on its micro-level causes and consequences, the book's international contributors argue that social capital is fundamentally concerned with the value of social networks and about how people interact with each other.
The book suggests that different modes of participation have different consequences for creating - or destroying - a sense of community or participation. The diversity of countries, institutions and groups dealt with - from Indian castes to Dutch churches, from highly competent 'everyday makers' in Scandinavia to politics-avoiding Belgian women and Irish villagers - offers fascinating case studies, and theoretical reflections for the present debates about civil society and democracy.
Social Capital and the Transition to Democracy
co-edited with Gabriel Badescu, Routledge, 2003
The concept of social capital has been used by political scientists to explain both the transition to democracy in Eastern Europe and the decline of social cohesion in Western societies. This edited collection presents the latest quantitative research on how post-communist countries are adapting to Western models of society. The book combines theoretical and institutional analysis with detailed case-studies looking at Russia, Poland, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Romania and the former East Germany.
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